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Abstract 
Mumbai Metro is planning to build 152 km of high-speed urban rail lines. The first line of 
Mumbai Metro was built through a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and opened in 
2014. Financial issues since its opening necessitated a fare increase—among one of 
the highest in India to maintain the line's commercial viability for the private operator. 
This paper examines how high dependence on farebox revenue could have been 
avoided by using Land Value Capture (LVC) to finance Mumbai Metro. A panel data 
hedonic price model was used to assess the impact of Mumbai Metro's commencement 
on approximately 66,000 apartments. The model shows a significant uplift of 14% in 
property prices in the Mumbai Metro catchment area resulting in USD 179 million value 
capture opportunity under Mumbai’s existing legislative framework. This paper suggests 
that LVC could enable a PPP urban rail projects to achieve financial and social viability 
if governance systems can enable appropriate mechanisms.  
Key Words: Urban rail, Public-Private Participation, Land Value Capture, Mumbai Metro.  
1. Introduction 
21st century India has opened over new 10 urban rail systems and is planning another 
40. Mumbai1 is the first Indian city to conceptualise a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
model for urban rail. The concept hinged on projected ridership resulting from a traffic 
demand model. The planning process did not factor the impact of urban rail on land 
value and prospective Land Value Capture (LVC). The traffic demand model has failed 
and the existing ridership amounts to only half the anticipated number. This has led the 
private operator to request an increase of the fare through a Fare Fixation Committee 
(FFC) (2015) of the Government of India. The FFC noted that non-fare box revenue 
                                               
1 The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai area (generally referred to as Greater Mumbai) was 
considered as the study area for this research. It is referred to as ‘Mumbai’ in the paper. 
options are limited therefore an increase in fares creates the only way to make Mumbai 
Metro commercially operational. The FFC however did not explore the option of land-
based financing. The fare hike has not been implemented yet as Mumbai Metro's 
government partner has taken legal recourse rebuking the hike and arguing that higher 
fares would render the system unaffordable for members of society's low-income 
sections. Such issues of finding how to balance commercially and equity in transit are 
common around the world (King & Streeting, 2016; Suzuki et. al, 2015; Ubbels et al., 
2001) 
In this paper, we examine whether the proposal for the Mumbai Metro could have 
incorporated LVC as a source of finance, and thus the proposed fare hike could have 
been avoided. The role of LVC in achieving a balance between affordable fares and 
business viability in PPP’s has been an issue in other cities (Sharma, Newman & 
Matan, 2015; Smith & Gihring, 2006; Suzuki et. al, 2015). To investigate this in Mumbai, 
a Hedonic Price Model (HPM) was estimated to assess the impact of Mumbai Metro's 
11 km Line 1 commencement on the value of land in its catchment area. This research 
is essential in highlighting this impact, as Mumbai is planning to expand Mumbai Metro 
to 190 km in the next 6 years (Bloomberg, 2017). This paper further discusses which 
LVC mechanisms can be applied in Mumbai based on a literature review and existing 
applicable LVC mechanisms in Mumbai. 
2. Conventional funding sources 
Public transport systems have historically faced financial deficit when highly dependent 
on farebox revenue and government funds (Sharma, Newman & Matan, 2015; Ubbels 
et al., 2001). The cost-revenue gap is considered widest in urban rail as this is one of 
the most capital-intensive forms of city public transport (Knight & Trygg; 1977; Viton, 
1980). Urban rail is supported primarily by public funds as its cost-revenue structure 
(business model) is burdened by labour-intensive construction, increasing maintenance 
needs of older systems and increasing travel demand due to urbanisation 
(Transportation Research Board [TRB], 1998). Public funds are generally in the form of 
capital loans and operational subsidies.  
Subsidy can be defined as a payment not requiring direct exchange of goods or 
services of equal market value in return. It is aimed at accomplishing a specific objective 
or effect (Black, 1995, as cited in Ubbels et al., 2001). Subsidy for public transport is 
justifiable for it being a ‘service’. However, subsidies impose one or both of higher taxes 
and reduced spending on other public services (Smith & Gihring, 2006). Proost et al. 
(1999, as cited in Ubbels et al. 2001) argue that subsidies work against economic 
efficiency when they become excessive. 
Another form of public funds i.e. loans involve significant risk for the borrower. Flyvberg 
(2007) provides empirical evidence for this from a study on 44 urban rail projects 
(including extension projects) completed between 1966 and 1997 in North America (18), 
Europe (13) and developing nations (13) worth approximately USD 37 billion (2005 
prices). The study revealed (Flyvberg, 2007): 
1. Average cost escalation for urban rail is 45% in constant prices. 
2. For 25% of urban rail projects, cost escalation is at least 60%. 
3. Actual ridership is on average 51% lower than forecast. 
4. For 25% of urban rail projects, actual ridership is at least 68% lower than forecast 
(Flyvberg, 2007). 
Flyvberg (2007) concluded that urban rail reflects a risk profile when cost and revenue 
risk are combined. Borrowings on projects with high economic risk are most likely to 
push the nation into a series of debt and significant fiscal deficit. These studies were 
mostly from 20th century projects and since then significantly better patronage has 
happened in urban rail (Newman, Kenworthy & Glazebrook, 2013). However, the stark 
problem of urban rail requiring capital loans and operational subsidies continues. 
In emerging Indian cities, the loan borrowing scenario discussed above impacts public 
and private players differently. The cities have raised soft loans from international 
donors at about 1%-2% interest rate against a sovereign guarantee to develop urban 
rail. The funds have been used to construct publicly-owned urban rail systems. The 
sovereign guarantee option was not available to privately built and operated projects 
(such as Mumbai Metro) leading them to borrow at a high interest rate (market rate of 
over 11%) (FFC, 2015). 
Urban rail projects in India both public and private are running into losses. The privately-
operated systems i.e. Mumbai Metro and Gurgaon Metro have raised fares to 
compensate for losses but the public systems rely on government subsidies. Neither of 
these financing models is economically progressive as fare hikes can exclude sections 
of society from urban rail. 
The universal issue of finding a more viable and progressive way of financing the 
building and operations of urban rail is pushed in this paper by examining how 
governments can tap the quantitative value created by public investments in urban rail 
through land value increase. This will be done by examining the case study of Mumbai 
and how the potential of Indian metro projects can be improved in general through land 
value capture (Banister & Thurstain-Goodwin, 2011; Lohia, as recorded in Blagg, 2015). 
3. Literature review 
3.1. Impact of urban rail on land value 
Urban rail impact on land value is well established. There is a wealth of empirical 
studies demonstrating increase in land value due to urban rail in both developed and 
emerging cities (see Anantsuksomsri & Tontisirin, 2015; Armstrong & Rodriguez, 2006; 
Cervero, 2003; Du & Mulley, 2007; Garrett, 2004; Laakso, 1992; Medda & Modelewska, 
2010; McIntosh, Trubka & Newman, 2014; Mulley, 2014; Sharma & Newman, 2017; 
Yankaya, 2004). Governments are recognizing this can be used as a significant source 
of public finance, for example in India and Australia they have instructed their state and 
city authorities to act on LVC implementation (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016; 
Ministry of Urban Development, 2017). City deals in Australia now require partnership 
with all levels of government and the private sector in order to create LVC mechanisms 
to pay back infrastructure (Smart Cities Plan, 2017). 
3.1.1. Impact assessment using hedonic price model 
In theory, urban rail transit systems catalyse development opportunities and enhance 
accessibility of adjacent properties, increasing their desirability, locational value and 
land value (McIntosh, Trubka & Newman, 2011; Newman & Kenworthy, 2015). This 
increase can be calculated using econometric price models specifically hedonic price 
models which have been used extensively to calculate this increase. 
HPM is based on the notion that land/property value is a sum of different attributes 
affecting land value. Thus, the land price can be divided into the component (or 
‘hedonic’) prices of each attribute. The HPM involves the application of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression analysis which requires a linear relationship between the 
dependent variable (e.g. property value) and independent (explanatory) variables (e.g. 
characteristics of property). The HPM functional forms include linear, linear-log, log-
linear and log-log. It is one of the most applied methods to identify the effects on house 
prices associated with factors such as proximity to transportation facilities, the subject 
for this study. Over 30 studies have used HPM to calculate the impact of transit on land 
values (McIntosh, Trubka & Newman, 2011; Sharma & Newman, 2017). 
A basic meta-analysis equation can be: 
Y = f (P,X,R,T,L) + Є 
Where, 
Y = Independent variable under examination 
P = Set of causes of the outcome Y 
X = Characteristics of the set of objects under examination affected by P, to determine 
outcome Y 
R = Characteristics of the research method 
T = Time period covered by the study 
L = Location of each study conducted 
Є = Error term 
Estimation of the windfall gains using HPM depends to a large extent on the nature of 
data and attributes selected for the model. The attributes include factors influencing 
land value like distance accessibility to work centres, transit, neighbourhood 
characteristics and others. Zhao and Larson (2011) highlight the limitation of 
econometric models as it is difficult to separate the value uplift due to improved 
transport accessibility from the uplift due to general increase. However, size and nature 
of data can ensure efficiency in assessments through availability of updated registries 
and detailed data sets. 
HPM cases from developed and emerging cities show significant increase in land 
values due to urban rail, few cases are marked below: 
In developed cities:  
1. An HPM study on Perth by McIntosh, Trubka & Newman (2014) showed 40% 
increase due to commencement of an urban rail line.  
2. In Lisbon, this value was found to be 6%, calculated by Martinez & Viegas (2009) 
through HPM. 
3. A study on the San Francisco Bay Area revealed that for every metre a single-family 
home was closer to an urban rail station in 1990, its sales price increased by USD 
2.29 per meter (Landis, Guhathakurta & Zhang, 1994).  
4. An HPM study in 1993 on residential properties adjacent to the 14.5-mile urban rail 
in Philadelphia concluded that access to rail created an average housing value 
premium of 6.4% (Voith, 1993). 
In emerging cities:  
1. Sharma & Newman’s (2017) HPM study on Bengaluru showed a 23% increase in 
land value in the 1 km catchment area of urban rail and of great significance it 
appears to have increased land values over the whole city (up to 29 km out) by an 
average of 4.5%.  
2. An HPM study for Izmir reveals a proximity premium of up to 16% for properties 
within 1 km of the transit station (Yankaya, 2004). 
3. Anantsuksomsri & Tontisirin’s (2015) HPM study on Bangkok shows windfall gain at 
USD 9,210 per km proximity to transit station.  
4. Beijing’s HPM study showed property premiums of 0.35% per 100 m proximity to 
urban rail station (Zhang & Wang, 2013).  
These examples support the case for assessment of the land value impact using HPM 
in emerging cities. If the assessment is positive, cities can potentially utilise LVC as a 
public finance instrument. 
3.2. Land value capture  
LVC focuses on realizing a portion of the increase in land value originating from urban 
rail as public revenue through taxes and fees (Medda and Modelewska, 2010). LVC 
mechanisms can be structured to support cost recovery in the case of urban rail transit 
projects (Bahl & Linn, 2014). The structuring involves factors such as timing of 
application (before or after transit development), payment schedule, scale and actors 
involved (Connolly & Wall, 2016; Medda, 2012; Peterson, 2009; Smolka, 2013; Walters, 
2012; Zhao, Iacono & Lari, 2012), and incidence (Chapman, 2017). Various LVC 
structures can be designed to optimise returns from the potential of land either in sum or 
on-site land improvements that benefit the community and foster urban development. 
The following subsections discuss the four broad classifications of LVC that have been 
used for urban infrastructure and specifically transportation, and which can be applied in 
urban rail. 
3.2.1. Betterment contributions  
These are taxes or fees levied on properties to fund capital or operation and 
maintenance cost for the infrastructure. Landowners pay specific taxes for payment 
schedules of varied duration. The payment may commence before, during or after the 
infrastructure is developed and can be charged from local to city scale. Examples of 
betterment contributions include land value tax, transport utility fee and betterment levy.  
Latin American cities have been levying betterment tax to fund infrastructure since the 
17th century (Reyes, 1980, as cited in Smolka, 2013). Latin American countries have 
national legislation that allow the local government to capture the unearned income 
(Plusvalias in Spanish) resulting from a public investment in order to be shared with the 
public. In Bogotá, the betterment fees (contribución de valorización) contributed USD 
1.0 billion from 1997-2007, and USD 1.1 billion was planned to be collected for 2008-
2015 (Smolka, 2013). 
France has established a public transport funding system known as “Versement 
Transport”. It is a specific tax paid by public or private companies when there are more 
than nine workers located within a 10,000 habitants urban transport limit (Pascal, 2003, 
as cited in Milan, 2015). The idea is to tax property owners that benefit from the 
transport infrastructure. The funds collected are used to cross-finance operational costs 
and/or new transport infrastructure. 
Betterment contribution is considered easy to understand and economically efficient as 
it is aligned with the benefits of public investment. It is favourable, in terms of benefit 
distribution equity, as it generates public funds. However, it has some equity 
considerations as some of the population may not be able to pay but it can be means 
tested. The levy is viable long-term as a low tax rate remains adequate with its 
extensive target base even if the economic growth potential is uncertain (Connolly & 
Wall, 2016). It is easy to implement, however accurate property valuations can be 
challenging. Overall, it is a progressive tax and is consistent with efficient urban growth. 
3.2.2. Regulatory charges & negotiated development 
This LVC mechanism imposes a levy on private developers for any development or 
spatial transformation triggered by the transport project. The rationale is that the private 
development benefits from the accessibility provided by the infrastructure set-up using 
public funds. The levy could be in the form of monetary payment (e.g. change in land 
use and development impact fee), special building permissions (transfer of development 
rights, air rights and purchasable zoning) and negotiated provisions (execution of public 
works and forfeiture of a portion of development area). The levy is in addition to the 
existing charges proportional to the windfall gains by developers due to infrastructure. 
The revenue from the levy is used to fund public infrastructure. They may be exacted 
either upfront or ongoing. 
Hass-Klau (2006) explains how this mechanism works in Germany. For a license to 
build in Munich, a land developer must obtain the current land value from a real estate 
experts’ panel, as the land value is bound to increase once construction commences. 
This increase in value may be claimed (up to as high as 2/3) by government to finance 
the construction of public infrastructure. The rest of the value accrues to the land 
developer. 
The objective of regulatory charges and negotiated development levies is to realize the 
opportunity created by the transport infrastructure and boost urban development in its 
catchment area. The proportional nature of such taxation promotes stability and 
efficiency in land markets. However, these LVC tools may intrude on the developer’s 
share of the benefit equity and developer’s may compensate by choosing to build high-
income residences in a desirable market. Thus it may not be a progressive LVC 
mechanisms. 
3.2.3. Taxed local development 
This category of LVC mechanisms involves payment of taxes at an elevated rate to fund 
projects identified for local development. The rate is fixed by earmarking future revenue 
to finance current expenditures aimed at accessibility improvement. The payers include 
residents and business-owners from an identified catchment area. A few examples 
include tax increment financing, business improvement district, benefit assessment 
district (BAD) and business rate supplement (BRS). 
The development of Crossrail in the Greater London Area is financed partially by BRS. 
The BRS is expects to fund GBP 4.1 billion of the GBP 14.8 billion project by 2038. It 
requires non-domestic properties with rateable values above GBP 55,000 to pay higher 
tax (2 pence for a pound). The tax will to be increased by 15% in revaluations to take 
place every five years. In the first financial year 2010-11, collection surpassed the 
projected amount (Roukouni & Medda, 2012). Considering the project is on a regional 
scale, the LVC mechanism does not include specific local development projects and 
focuses entirely on financing the Crossrail.  
The BADs in San Francisco are highly successful. The process begins with constitution 
of a local committee by the district’s residents, business owners, tenants, schools and 
developers. The committee prepares a local development proposal including financial 
plan and seeks approval from the local government. The proposal is aimed at uplifting 
services and infrastructure level in the district to boost business and accelerate local 
economic growth. The local government scrutinises the proposal and grants BAD 
eligibility to the district. The district residents are charged with elevated property taxes to 
fund the development. Involvement of developers in the committee from early stages 
catalyses investment. Funds from the BADs have been used for various infrastructure 
projects including the urban rail system. The Los Angeles Red Line sourced 9% of the 
construction cost (USD 1.4 billion) from BADs (Clark & Mountford, 2007). 
The LVC tools of this category encourage deliberation as the local development projects 
are either initiated by or drafted in consultation with residents. The projects range from 
developing transit hub, bicycle lanes, social housing, and public amenities, to 
redeveloping brownfields. The tool enables financing of various improvements in 
districts with low accessibility levels or low quality services, to induce economic growth. 
This encourages private investors to further invest in the district as the development is 
certain and so is their financial gain. However, there may be a few unintended effects 
like an inflated market and displacement of low-income residents (Medda, 2012). 
3.2.4. Joint development on public-private partnership 
This tool involves the private sector from the beginning. The public sector enables 
private sector bids for a joint development of a transport project and the adjacent land. 
The private sector is involved either directly in the development or through financial 
support for the same. The development can proceed by privatisation of public land or 
public acquisition of private land for private leasing. Joint development involves mutual 
benefit for the public and private partner while the finance and risks are externalised to 
the private partner. The most suitable examples of joint development are in Hong Kong 
and Japan. 
Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR) Corporation co-develop land around stations 
with private developers in order to cover its capital and operational costs. This approach 
guides the city’s urban fabric through high-density development along metro corridors 
as land market’s accessibility attracts people closer to the transit with 41% (in 2002) of 
Hong Kong’s population residing within the catchment area (500m) of a metro station 
(Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2004, 8). MTR turned a net loss in 1980s into profit 
worth USD 2 billion in 2015 (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 13; Mass Transit Railway, 
2016, p. 33) using joint development. 
Japan has historically used joint development in order to amalgamate irregularly formed 
properties that result in smaller but fully serviced urban neighbourhoods and sale of 
'extra' land to fund railways. The government, as in-kind support, enables land 
consolidation and acquisition. This approach is popularly known as land adjustment. 
Land readjustment helps in efficiently assembling the right of way for a new rail line and 
land parcels for development. The approach is different to Hong Kong as they go 
beyond individual buildings. Economic downturn in the last few decades in Japan 
resulted in additional strategies for value capture such as strategic infill urban 
development around train stations (Metrolinx, 2013). 
Cape Town offers a case to illustrate joint development using a PPP. A sum of USD 1.0 
billion was raised through the sale of Victoria and Albert Waterfront property by 
Transnet (the parastatal transportation agency) in 2006 were used to recapitalize 
Transnet and support its investment in core transportation infrastructure (Peterson & 
Kaganova 2010).  
The Entrepreneur Rail Model (Newman, Davies-Slate & Jones 2017) emphasizes 
utilizing private sector resources and skills to co-develop urban rail and adjacent land. 
This model’s concept begins by assessing the amount of land that can be developed 
and used as the primary fund source, followed by planning the development and finally 
estimating a transit patronage to suit the development. The government asks for bids to 
build, own and operate new transit lines based on fare box and land development 
opportunities created by the consortia. This ensures that the urban rail is constructed 
along the right-of-way that promises high ridership and more importantly an on-going 
way of paying for their infrastructure through land development. This model is 
happening in Florida (Newman, Beatley and Boyer, 2017). 
3.3. Land Value Capture and economic equality 
Tax on land value is a progressive tax for several reasons. George (1879) argued that 
the economic rental generated when the location value of land is improved (non-
produced inputs) through public works is the most rational source of public revenue 
(Ingram & Hong, 2011). It helps counter economic inequality (Plummer, 2010) as it 
charges the beneficiaries of the project and is applied in proportion to land values and 
land ownership (which is unequally distributed). It also addresses public concern 
surrounding imbalanced windfalls—factual or perceived—for owners of specific land 
units whose values increase following public investment in infrastructure. This tax can 
not only help the existing urban rail systems become financially viable and expand their 
network more rapidly but can also enable other cities’ self-reliance to implement urban 
rail. 
The financial viability of urban rail allows planners and project managers to implement 
and package urban rail projects in a manner that promotes amenity and affordable 
housing by providing incentives to developers to consider elements that address social 
equity concerns (some percentage of housing reserved for every income class), local 
community spaces, work centres, shopping areas and community services, where all 
these would ideally be at walking distance from the mass transit (Chava & Newman, 
2016; Matan & Newman, 2016; Pendall, Gainsborough, Lowe & Nguyen, 2012).2 
4. Case Study - Mumbai Metro 
Mumbai is a mega city and the financial capital of India. It is the centre of commercial, 
cultural and trade activities. Mumbai developed as a monocentric city initially (19th and 
early 20th century) with port, industry, government, banking and insurance, stock 
exchange and wholesale trade being concentrated in its southern neighbourhoods. In 
the latter half of the 20th century Mumbai grew linearly as a polycentric city with a more 
diverse economy, attracting a sizeable immigrant population, effecting a four-fold 
population increase i.e. around 3 million in 1951 to around 12 million in 2011 (BMC, 
2015). The linear development occurred due to the geographic boundaries of Mumbai 
and was enabled by the north-south connectivity provided by the suburban rail network. 
                                               
2 In India, government housing authorities are legislatively bound to include housing for every income 
group in housing schemes. In some states, like Madhya Pradesh, private developments must also include 
a percentage of housing for economically weaker sections.  
These factors enabled Mumbai to develop as a dense city with high demand for its 
urban rail system. 
The number of public transport users in Mumbai amounts to over 11 million accounting 
for 75% of total daily trips (BMC, 2016). This high percentage is attributable mostly to 
the suburban railway (43)% as it is the fastest and most reliable mode to travel in the 
highly congested corridor than bus or car. This mode-share of public transport remained 
constant through two decades before shifting slightly in recent years with public 
transport declining nominally and private modes rising (BMC, 2016). Both private 
vehicle ownership and road capacity have increased in the last decade but further 
growth is impossible due to spatial constraints. Expansion of the rail system has been 
demanded due to heavy overloading, lack of east-west rail connectivity and delay in 
implementing further rail options (BMC, 2015; 2016). Thus Mumbai is planning to 
implement a Mumbai Metro (Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, 
2013). The government has estimated that 43% (USD 11 billion) of the total investment 
in Mumbai’s transport sector should be allocated towards investment in Mumbai Metro 
(BMC, 2016). 
4.1. Mumbai Metro 
Mumbai Metro was conceptualized on the Build, Own, Operate and Transfer model (a 
PPP model) with a 35-year concession period (5 years’ construction, 30 years’ 
operation). Commercial operations of Line 1 of the Mumbai Metro (about 11 km) were 
successfully commenced on June 8, 2014. A special purpose vehicle (SPV) was 
constituted to implement the Mumbai Metro Line 1 with the selected concessionaire and 
government agency entitled to 74% and 26% equity share capital respectively (Mumbai 
Metro, 2013). The SPV serves to design, finance, build, operate, maintain and transfer 
the system to the state government at the end of the concession period. 
A key impact of Mumbai Metro is that the reduction in travel time for its 11-km corridor is 
from 71 minutes to 21 minutes. It provides an essential link between the suburban 
eastern rail line and the suburban western rail line and areas unserved by the suburban 
rail system. It is integrated to the suburban rail system through a foot-bridge thus 
making it an integrated system. Additionally, the rail line’s adjacent area has emerged 
as a business district over the past two decades and the high population density of 
Mumbai can result in high ridership (Rangwala, Mathews & Sridhar, 2014). These 
factors were all considered to provide the Mumbai Metro with a significant advantage 
that should provide sufficient patronage to pay for the system. However, although the 
daily ridership of 0.3 million on 11 km (11 stations) is high on any global comparison, it 
is not reaching the anticipated levels of over 0.5 million in 2016 (Mumbai Metropolitan 
Region Development Authority, 2013; Sharma, 2017).  
The ridership shortfall of 60% significantly impact the revenue of Mumbai Metro as the 
project is depends predominantly on farebox and partially on non-farebox (rent from 
shops at stations and advertisement). Mumbai Metro has consistently run into 
substantial financial loss since operations commenced. The 2015-16 losses amounted 
to USD 44 million (Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 2016). Being a private system on at limited 
35-year lease period it is essential for it to overcome the financial loss. 
There seem to be three main causes for Mumbai Metro’s financial loss. Firstly, 
construction costs blew out by around 83% following construction delay, which heavily 
impacted on the repayment of capital loans3. Secondly, the private operator raised 
capital at standard market interest rates (over 11%) rather than acquiring soft loans like 
other Indian government metro systems (e.g. Delhi Metro) which raised capital from 
international donors at a minimal (about 1%) interest rate under the sovereign 
guarantee of India (FFC, 2015). This rate of interest creates repayment of raised capital 
substantial and pushes an operator to optimize its revenue. The last factor is the 
dependence on farebox revenue which we discuss in the next section and is the more 
fundamental factor. 
4.2. Mumbai Metro’s financial challenge 
A detailed discussion on Mumbai Metro’s fare structure merits an introduction to the 
legislative framework governing fare fixation of urban rail projects in India: Railways 
being a subject of federal jurisdiction in India, Indian urban rail projects are implemented 
under the federal legislation Metro Railway Act of 2002. The Act allows the operator to 
fix the initial fare independently, while fare revision is decided upon by a Fare Fixation 
Committee (FFC) constituted by the federal government. 
The financial health of operational Mumbai Metro Line 1 did not reflect the vision of the 
project’s conception, that of high ridership resulting in high farebox revenue enabling a 
commercially viable PPP project. In order to overcome financial losses the operator 
demanded to increase the fare and a FFC was set-up to fix the fare in 2015. The FFC 
report highlights that the Mumbai Metro project had raised capital at market interest 
rates and relied on farebox revenue to sustain the system commercially4. 
The FFC recommended a higher fare for Mumbai Metro which could render it one of the 
most expensive commuter urban rail systems in India. The proposed fare stands at INR 
110 (USD 1.7) for 11 km at INR 10 per station, while the existing fare is (sold as 
                                               
3 The private operator blames the government approval and the private operator has been criticized by a 
few civil society organizations for artificial escalation of project costs (Kulkarni & Shaikh, 2014) 
4 The FFC notes that Mumbai Metro should explore options to increase non-fare revenue but are limited 
with no mention to land value capture, this may be due to their scope of work. 
discounted fare) INR 40 (USD 0.6). While Mumbai Metro’s revised fare is comparable to 
that of urban rail systems in developed world cities including Milan, Tokyo and Sydney, 
it significantly exceeds that of other Indian metro systems - Jaipur Metro (INR 20 for 
comparable distance), Delhi Metro (INR 18 for comparable distance), entirely privately 
owned Rapid Metro Gurgaon (INR 20 for 5 km). The FFC notes that the steep fare hike 
may not even suffice for the operator to recover their cost for the next few years. This 
reflects the substantial lacunae in the project’s planning and risk analysis. A section of 
the FFC report notes that the private operator is not sharing risks on delay in the project 
which may contradict the fundamental principle of PPP projects. Rather, the private 
operator seemingly seeks to pass such costs (risk) on to the people of Mumbai.  
The significant fare hike can have social and political impacts for Mumbai as it is an 
emerging city with the majority of population residing in slums at significantly low 
income levels. It is apparent that for many Mumbai Metro users cost is not an overriding 
factor compared to comfort, travel time saving, safety and convenience. However, cost 
overrides all factors for members of economically weaker sections of society whose 
transport costs command a significant share of living expenses. Cropper and 
Bhattacharya (2012) note that Mumbai’s economically weaker section spend the highest 
percent of their income on public transport (16%) among all economic classes. This was 
noted when the public transport was highly subsidized (in year 2012) by the 
government. 
Despite the burdensome cost (higher fare than Milan’s subway), Mumbai commuters 
might resort to using Mumbai Metro to save 50 minutes on a one-way trip as no other 
travel option exists. 
The concerns discussed in this section can significantly hinder private investment in 
future PPP urban rail projects in India and emerging cities. Over-reliance on farebox 
revenue towards sustaining a privately-funded metro project poses a critical issue for 
emerging countries seeking substantial private investment in the urban rail sector. 
The Mumbai Metro case demonstrates how governments may fail to balance urban rail 
fare affordability, travel time and private investment in emerging cities. Such a scenario 
demands that the government explore non-farebox revenue sources, specifically LVC 
that—as discussed in the literature review—are generally economically progressive. 
The subsequent sections investigate the application of LVC to Mumbai Metro. The study 
involved using HPM to calculate the impact of Mumbai Metro’s commencement on 
property values, followed by exploring the LVC options suitable to Mumbai. 
5. Hedonic Price Model for Mumbai Metro 
The study considered panel data HPM to evaluate the impact of commencement of 
Mumbai Metro’s Line 1 (11 km line operation since June 2014). Thus, panel data HPM 
consisting of the years 2014 (before rail) and 2015 (after rail) were investigated. The 
dependent and independent variables used for panel data HPM are discussed in the 
two succeeding sections. 
5.1. Dependent variable 
This study uses the average sale price of residential apartment projects (hereafter 
referred to as property) in Mumbai as a dependent variable for the panel data HPM. 
Property data were collected from a real estate company for March 2014 and March 
2015. The data set comprised 333 property samples (about 66,000 apartments)5 for 
each year. 
5.2. Independent variables 
Explanatory variables influencing property price were considered based on 
neighbourhood variables, accessibility variables and city-specific variables. Additionally, 
property price and metro rail specific time dummy variables were included. A property 
price dummy variable was included for 2015 prices to estimate the conventional annual 
increase in property prices. Table 1 lists the variables used for the panel data HPM with 
their descriptive statistics. 
The following Mumbai Metro rail corridor specific dummy variables were included to 
investigate the impact of the commencement of Mumbai Metro: 
1. Properties located within 0 km to 0.5 km from metro station: includes 4% samples of 
total sample 
2. Properties located within 0.5 km to 1 km from metro station: includes 5% samples of 
total sample 
3. Properties located within 1 km to 2 km from metro station: includes 7% samples of 
total sample 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Sl. No. Variables Mean Std. Deviation 
1. Property price 22,016.2 13,401.7 
2. Property price 2015 (dummy variable) 0.5 0.5 
3. Distance from local activity centre 0.5 0.30 
                                               
5 A property sample used in the study consists of around 200 apartments of varying size and type, which 
suggests that individual samples hold a substantial quantum for analysis. 
Sl. No. Variables Mean Std. Deviation 
4. Distance from airport 9.3 4.6 
5. Distance from central business district 11.1 7.3 
6. Distance from suburban railway station 1.4 1.0 
7. Distance from park 0.5 0.3 
8. Distance from inter-city railway station 4.3 3.1 
9. Distance from coast line 2.7 1.6 
10. Distance from industrial area 2.1 1.3 
5.3. Results from panel data HPM 
Four functional forms (linear, log-linear, linear-log and log-log) were tested for the panel 
data HPM. Investigating the different functional forms of HPM was necessary for 
identifying the form best suited for the study. Statistical software (SPSS 22) was used 
for estimating the HPM. 
Out of the four functional forms, only the log-linear functional form was statistically 
significant for the desired explanatory variables and not random up to 99.99%. 
According to the analysis presented in Table 2, the log-linear functional form of the 
panel data HPM explains 58.4% of the variation in the dependent variable, 
demonstrating that the model is statistically significant. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) test was also conducted, to avoid estimation errors caused by a multicollinearity 
issue. The test showed that all explanatory variables’ VIF values were lower than 3, 
ruling out serious collinearity concerns in the model. 
Table 2: Model summary and ANOVA6 for statistically significant variables 
Model 
Model summary ANOVA 
Function Adjusted R2 
Std. error of 
the estimate 
F Significance 
Panel Data 
HPM 
Log-
Linear 
0.584 0.315 94.499 0.000 
Table 3 displays the panel data HPM results for the impact of statistically significant 
explanatory variables on Mumbai’s property price. The statistical significance of the 
property price dummy variable for 2015 shows that the model recognizes the panel data 
for both 2014 and 2015, which is essential for panel data HPM. In the Mumbai Metro 
                                               
6 Analysis of variance 
catchment specific time dummy variables only 1 km to 2 km were statistically significant 
in the calibrated model7. 
Table 3: OLS log-linear HPM of property price in Mumbai (2014 to 2015) 
Sl. 
no. 
Explanatory 
variables 
Coefficients 
Std. 
error 
Significance 
% increase in 
mean property 
price with a unit 
increase in 
explanatory 
variables 
1 (Constant) 10.859 0.06 0 -  
2 Property price 2015 
(dummy variable) 0.049 0.025 0.05 4.9% 
3 Price change in 
properties at 1 km – 
2 km from metro 
stations 0.142 0.072 0.04 14.2% 
4 Distance from 
activity centre -0.318 0.041 0.00 -31.8% 
5 Distance from 
airport -0.029 0.003 0.00 -2.9% 
6 Distance from 
central business 
district -0.028 0.003 0.00 -2.8% 
7 Distance from 
suburban railway 
station 0.039 0.014 0.00 3.9% 
8 Distance from park -0.09 0.04 0.02 -9.0% 
9 Distance from inter-
city railway station -0.027 0.005 0.00 -2.7% 
10 Distance from coast 
line -0.11 0.01 0.00 -11.0% 
11 Distance from 
industrial area 0.059 0.012 0.00 5.9% 
Note: 
                                               
7 This may be due to the lower sample size at 0 km - 0.5 km and 0.5 km - 1 km and due to the slums and 
industrial area around the stations. 
1. *Dummy variable 
The calibrated panel data HPM shows that the commencement of Mumbai Metro 
resulted in a windfall gain of 14% in the properties located within 1 km to 2 km from 
metro stations. This property value uplift seems to align with the Knight Frank (2015) 
report which notes the highest value uplift happened in the micro-markets adjacent to 
the Mumbai Metro as compared to all real estate micro-markets in Mumbai. This 
significant increase can be attributed to the travel time saving and new network linkages 
as discussed in detail in the ‘Mumbai Metro’ section of this paper. Commuters can get 
easy access to reach the 1-2 km catchment area through walking8 and paratransit 
modes like auto rickshaw/ taxi/ cycle rickshaw which help explain the 14% increase out 
to the 1-2 km catchment. 
The calibrated panel data HPM results also shows a conventional annual increase of 
about 5% in the studied properties from 2014 to 2015. This is a direct reflection from the 
real estate data. The model shows that with each km decrease in distance from the 
activity centre increases property prices by 32%. This is attributable to the diversified 
economy of Mumbai, emergence of activity centres and their local economic benefits. 
The HPM model shows that a km decrease in distance from suburban railway stations 
decreases property prices by 3.9%. There are two possible reasons for this, firstly, 
residents of an emerging city are deterred from residing adjacent to the rail station as it 
attracts informal commercial setups, hawking activities, traffic congestion, pollution and 
presence of access/egress modes or paratransit modes like auto rickshaw creating 
highly crowded conditions in the immediate surroundings of the stations. Secondly, the 
value of properties located equidistant from station on the west side and the east side 
vary significantly due to the local planning factors9.  
The HPM model predicts that a km decrease in distance from the coast increases 
property prices by 11%. This was predictable on the global phenomenon of residents 
willing to pay higher for residing closer to the coast. Whilst, a km decrease in distance 
from industrial areas decreases property prices by 6%. This was expected due to the 
polluting characteristics of industrial areas. 
5.4. Willingness to pay for Mumbai Metro 
                                               
8 Average walking trip distance of Mumbai commuters is about 1 km (Rastogi & Rao, 2003) 
9 The suburban railway divides Mumbai longitudinally and western part of the city has significantly higher 
land price as compared to the eastern part. 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) in monetary terms for the Mumbai Metro is calculated by 
multiplying the windfall gain from HPM with the average property price. 
The WTP for properties located within 1 km to 2 km from metro stations is INR 33,651 
(USD 524) per square meter due to the impact of the commencement of the Mumbai 
Metro Line 1. This windfall gain is substantial and results in an aggregate WTP of USD 
161 million10 when applied to the number of properties (22 studied samples) falling in 
the catchment area of 1 km to 2 km results. The total cost of Line 1 of the Mumbai 
Metro was about USD 670 million. Thus the value creation is highly significant in 
relation to the cost of building the metro and warrants an evaluation as to how LVC 
could have been applied. 
6. Discussion on Land Value Capture for Mumbai 
Mumbai is one of the few Indian cities with existing legislative provisions for LVC. 
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 entitles Brihanmumbai (Mumbai) 
Municipal Corporation (BMC) to levy development charges to sell additional floor 
area/space and on the change of land use. Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 
entitles BMC to collect property tax upon all land and buildings within the city and levy a 
betterment charge on the windfall gain due to any public investment (improvement 
project). 
The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) is the government 
authority involved in implementing the Mumbai Metro and is its part owner. MMRDA has 
approached the court on the fare hike issue. Therefore, we discuss MMRDA’s options to 
generate revenue through the LVC under their existing statutory powers.  
The MMRDA Act 1974, entitles them to levy ‘betterment charges’ on the windfall gains 
to private land owners due to MMRDA’s development project. This levy can’t be more 
than 50% of the windfall gain. The MMRDA is required to notify every land owner about 
the levy and allow three months to raise any concerns. In case an issue prevails, the 
individual can approach the court or arbitration panel. As per the MMRDA Act, the 
betterment charges apply only to land value for properties, not to the value of 
apartments or buildings. Based on our discussions with the MMRDA, they have 
considered implementing betterment charges for Mumbai Metro but have not been able 
to implement it. This is due to the lack of empirical analysis available on the windfall 
increase in land values and its catchment area due to Mumbai Metro commencement. 
                                               
10 Each apartment measured 70 sq m and each apartment project included 200 apartments. 
This study fills this knowledge gap to show the impact of Mumbai Metro Line 1 on 
residential values11. 
The estimated 14% windfall gain applied on land value within the 1 km to 2 km 
residential catchment area12 from Mumbai Metro results in an estimated revenue of 
USD 179 million13, based on the government land rate of about INR 60,000 (USD 934) 
square meter (at a very conservative rate) 14. This substantial revenue can sustain 
Mumbai Metro losses for the next four years (based on their existing USD 44 million 
loss in 2016) without any substantial hike fares. This study could help government 
committee’s and policy makers in emerging cities to show how LVC can to implemented 
to finance urban rail. 
7. Conclusion 
This study has shown significant land value uplift potential due to the commencement of 
urban rail in Mumbai. The study illustrates that the impact of metro rail is beyond the 
traditional 500m. The analysis has shown that Mumbai could have used existing 
legislation to capture this uplift to make the PPP metro project financially viable along 
with keeping fares competitive. Although it is too late for the Line 1 phase of the Mumbai 
Metro, other phases could tap the LVC mechanism for funding. 
This paper illustrates how LVC for urban rail can be used to avoid a high dependence 
on farebox revenue with the consequent struggles over fare fixation. Mumbai is one city 
where the fare box may have been possible to cover all costs but even here it does not. 
Application of LVC is possibly necessary to enhance fare affordability and mitigate the 
financial strain imposed by public transport on the community in any city. 
The use of LVC will require governance to include financial mechanisms in future PPP 
arrangements that can enable the value increases around stations to be captured in a 
reasonable and transparent way. Detailed studies of land use along new lines can 
provide the basis of projected financial uptake based on the data from this first line. 
 
                                               
11 The MMRDA and the state government of Maharashtra had set up a committee to propose non-fare 
revenue, specifically LVC, options for financing urban rail projects. The committee discussed on key two 
points, first on how to evaluate the impact of urban rail and second how to implement land value tools. 
12 25% of the total area is under residential land use as per Draft Development Plan – 2034, Greater 
Mumbai, 2016. 
13 This calculation is based on the multiplication of residential area (25% of 22 million sq m), per sq m 
price (USD 934) and 25% betterment charge levy on windfall gain worth 14%. 
14 Mumbai has the highest real estate capital values as compared to any other Indian city (Knight Frank, 
2015). Thus application of land value capture tool can return substantial funds for urban rail. 
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